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Abstract—Personal identification and authentication is very 
crucial in the current scenario. Biometrics plays an important 
role in this area.  Biometric based authentication has proved 
superior compared to traditional password based authentication. 
Anyhow biometrics is permanent feature of a person and cannot 
be reissued when compromised as passwords. To over come this 
problem, instead of storing the original biometric templates 
transformed templates can be stored. Whenever the 
transformation function is changed new revocable/cancelable 
templates are generated. Soft biometrics is ancillary information 
that can be combined with primary biometrics to identify a 
person in a better way. Iris has certain advantage compared to 
other biometric traits like fingerprint. Iris is an internal part that 
is less prone to damage.  Moreover is very difficult for an attacker 
to capture an iris.  The key advantage of iris biometrics is its 
stability or template longevity. Biometric systems are vulnerable 
to a variety of attacks. This work generates cancelable iris 
templates by applying user and soft biometric based password 
transformations and further secures the templates by biometric 
cryptographic construct fuzzy vault. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Biometrics is automated methods of identifying a person or 
verifying the identity of a person based on a physiological or 
behavioral characteristic. Biometric characteristics that have 
been commonly used are fingerprints, iris, face, hand, retina, 
voice, signature and keystroke dynamics. Biometrics identifies 
‘you as you’. Biometrics serves as an excellent alternative to 
traditional token or password based authentication methods. 
Biometric systems are excellent compared over traditional 
authentication methods. Biometric traits cannot be lost or 
forgotten and they are inherently more reliable. It is very 
difficult to copy, share and distribute a biometric trait. 
Biometric system requires the person being authenticated to be 
present at the time and point of authentication.  
Anyhow biometrics cannot be revoked when they are 
spoofed. To overcome this cancelable biometric templates are 
generated that can be revoked when spoofed. Further they are 
secured by fuzzy vault construct. 
A. Merits of Iris 
Iris is the colored ring surrounding the pupil of the eye. Iris 
biometric has certain merits compared to finger print. It is 
highly secure and uses a stable physiological trait. Iris is very 
difficult to spoof. Iris texture is different for right and left eye. 
They are unique even for identical twins. Iris is less prone to 
either intentional or unintentional modification when compared 
to fingerprint. 
 
B. Soft Biometrics 
Soft biometrics provides ancillary information about a 
person (gender, ethnicity, age, height, weight, eye color etc). 
They lack distinctiveness or permanence. Hence Soft 
biometrics alone is not enough to differentiate two individuals. 
Anyhow when combined with primary biometrics (Fingerprint, 
Iris, Retina etc) soft biometrics gives better results.  
 
C. Cancelable Biometrics 
Passwords can be revoked when it is stolen. Biometrics 
cannot be revoked when spoofed. This is the only disadvantage 
of biometrics as compared to passwords. Therefore instead of 
storing the biometrics as such transformed templates are 
stored. Whenever a transformed biometric template is spoofed 
another new template can be generated by changing the 
transformation function. This makes the biometric cancelable/ 
revocable similar to password. For different applications 
different transformation function can be used. This prevents 
the attacker to use the same captured template for other 
applications. Like passwords these transformed templates can 
be reissued on spoofing. 
 
D. Operation of Fuzzy Vault 
Fuzzy vault is a cryptographic construct proposed by Juels 
and Sudan [2]. This construct is more suitable for applications 
where biometric authentication and cryptography are combined 
together. Fuzzy vault framework thus utilizes the advantages of 
both cryptography and biometrics. Fuzzy vault eliminates the 
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key management problem as compared to other practical 
cryptosystems. 
In fuzzy vault framework, the secret key S is locked by G, 
where G is an unordered set from the biometric sample. A 
polynomial P is constructed by encoding the secret S. This 
polynomial is evaluated by all the elements of the unordered 
set G. 
A vault V is constructed by the union of unordered set G and 
chaff point set C which is not in G. 
V = G U C 
The union of the chaff point set hides the genuine point set 
from the attacker. Hiding the genuine point set secures the 
secret data S and user biometric template T. 
The vault is unlocked with the query template T’. T’ is 
represented by another unordered set U’.  The user has to 
separate sufficient number of points from the vault V by 
comparing U’ with V. By using error correction method the 
polynomial P can be successfully reconstructed if U’ overlaps 
with U and secret S gets decoded. If there is not substantial 
overlapping between U and U’ secret key S is not decoded.  
This construct is called fuzzy because the vault will get 
decoded even for very near values of U and U’ and the secret 
key S can be retrieved. Therefore fuzzy vault construct become 
more suitable for biometric data which show inherent fuzziness 
hence the name fuzzy vault as proposed by Sudan [2].  
The security of the fuzzy vault depends on the infeasibility 
of the polynomial reconstruction problem. The vault 
performance can be improved by adding more number of chaff 
points C to the vault. 
 
E. Limitation of Fuzzy Vault Scheme  
 Fuzzy vault being a proven scheme has its own limitations 
[5]. 
 
(i) If the vault is compromised, the same biometric data 
cannot be used to construct a new vault. Fuzzy vault 
cannot be revoked.  Fuzzy vault is prone to cross- 
matching of templates across various databases. 
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(ii) Due to the non-uniform nature of the biometric features 
it is easy for an attacker to develop attacks based on 
statistical analysis of the points in the vault. 
(iii) The vault contains more chaff points than the genuine 
points. This facilitates the attacker to substitute few 
points from his own biometric feature. Therefore the 
vault authenticates both the genuine user and the 
imposter using the same biometric identity. As a 
consequence, the false acceptance ratio of the system 
increases.  
(iv) Original template of the genuine user is   temporarily 
exposed. During this exposure the attacker can glean the 
template.  
 
To overcome the limitations of fuzzy vault, password is used 
as an additional authentication factor.  The proposed Iris fuzzy 
vault is hardened by combined user and biometric password. 
This enhances the user-privacy and adds an additional level of 
security. 
 
F. Steps in Combined Password Hardened Fuzzy Vault 
The hardened fuzzy vault overcomes the limitations of non-
revocability and cross-matching by introducing an additional 
layer of security by password.  If the password is compromised 
the basic security and privacy provided by the fuzzy vault is 
not affected. However, a compromised password makes the 
security level same as that of a fuzzy vault. Therefore, security 
of the password is crucial.  It is very difficult for an attacker to 
compromise the biometric template and the combined 
password at the same time.  The proposed method constructs a 
fuzzy vault using the feature points extracted from iris. The iris 
biometric fuzzy vault is then hardened using the password. 
Steps in hardening scheme:  
 
1. A combined user and soft biometric password is 
generated. 
  
2. A random transformation function is derived from the 
user password. 
3. The password transformed function is applied to the Iris   
template.  
4. Fuzzy vault frame work is constructed to secure the 
transformed templates by using the feature points from 
the iris. 
5. The key derived from the same password is used to 
encrypt the vault.  
Figure 1 depicts the steps involved in the construction of the 
password hardened multi biometric fuzzy vault. 
  
The organization of the paper is as follows: Chapter II 
elaborates the background study. Section III explains the 
proposed generation of cancelable Iris template and securing 
them using fuzzy vault. Section IV discusses the experimental 
results and the security analysis. Section V concludes of the 
proposed work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Karthick Nandakumar et al [5] used the idea of password 
transformation for fingerprint and generated transformed 
templates. In his work those transformed templates are 
protected using fuzzy vault cryptographic construct in which 
password acts an additional layer of security. Iris based hard 
fuzzy vault proposed by Srinivasa Reddy [3] followed the 
same idea of [5] to generate revocable iris templates and 
secured them using password hardened fuzzy vault. The basic 
idea of generating cancelable iris is based on the idea derived 
from the work done by karthick Nandakumar et al [5] and 
Srinivasa Reddy[3].  
Iris based hard fuzzy vault proposed by Srinivasa Reddy [3] 
applies a sequence of morphological operations to extract 
minutiae points from the iris texture. This idea is utilized in the 
proposed method for extracting the minutiae feature point from 
the Iris. The same idea is used but with combined user and soft 
biometric password. 
Soft biometrics ideas derived from [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] are used 
for constructing soft biometric passwords. 
 
III. PROPOSED METHOD  
Revocable iris templates generation is carried out in the 
following three steps. In the first step the iris texture containing 
the highlighted minutiae feature points is subjected to simple 
permutation and translation. This results in the original 
minutiae points being transformed into new points. In the 
second step the soft biometric password is combined with the 
user password to get a new 64 bit password. In the third step, 
the simple transformed iris template is randomly transformed 
using password. This process enhances the user privacy and 
facilitates the generation of revocable templates and resists 
cross matching. This transformation reduces the similarity 
between the original and transformed template.  The 
transformed templates are further secured using the fuzzy vault 
construct. 
 
A. Extraction of Minutiae Feature point from Iris 
   The idea proposed by Srinivasa Reddy [3]  is utilized  to  
extract the minutiae feature points from the iris texture.  
   The following operations are applied to the iris images to 
extract lock/unlock data. Canny edge detection is applied on 
iris image to deduct iris. Hough transformation is applied first 
to  iris/sclera boundary and then to iris/pupil boundary. Then 
thresholding is done to isolate eyelashes. Histogram 
equalization is performed on iris to enhance the contrast. 
Finally the following sequence of morphological operations is 
performed on the enhanced iris structure.          
(i) closing-by-tophat 
(ii) opening 
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(iii) thresholding     
    
        Finally thinning is done to get structures as a collection of 
pixels. Now the (x, y) coordinates of the nodes and end points 
of the iris minutiae are extracted. Fig. 2(a) shows the localized 
iris image, Fig. 2(b) exhibits the iris image with the minutiae 
patterns and Fig 2(c) shows the permuted and transformed 
points. 
 
B. Minutiae Feature Point Transformation  
The Iris texture containing the highlighted minutiae feature 
points is subjected to simple permutation and translation. This 
results in the original minutiae points being transformed into 
new points.  
The user password is restricted to the size of 5 characters. 
The length of the user password is 40 bits. The soft biometric 
password [16,17.18] is generated by combining height, eye 
color, and gender. The combination of these three factors 
results in 24 bit soft biometric password (8 bit each). Therefore 
the length of the combined password is 64 bits. These 64 bits 
are divided into 4 blocks of each 16 bits in length.  
 
 
(a)  Localized Iris  Image 
 
(b)  Highlighted Iris Minutiae 
 
(c)  Red: Permuted Points and  Blue: Transformed Points 
Fig 2. Iris Minutiae Extraction and Password Transformation 
 
The feature points highlighted in Iris texture are divided into 
4 quadrants. One password block is assigned to each quadrant. 
Permutation is applied in such a way that the relation position 
of the minutiae point does not change. Each 16 bit password 
block is split into two components Tu of 7 bits and Tv of 9 bits 
in length. Tu and Tv represents the amount of translation in the 
horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. 
The new feature points are obtained by the following 
transformation. 
 
 
where Xu and X’u is the horizontal distance before and after 
transformation respectively. Similarly Yv and Y’v is the vertical 
distance before and after transformation respectively. 
 
C. Fuzzy vault Encoding 
The   transformed features are encoded in the fuzzy vault. 
Password acts as an extra layer of security to the vault.  It 
resists an imposter from modifying the vault.  Secret message 
is generated as a 128 bit random stream. This secret message is 
transformed with the password. The 16 bit CRC is appended to 
transformed key S to get 144 bit SC. The primitive polynomial 
considered for CRC generation is 
  
 
 
The minutiae points whose Euclidian distance is less than D 
are removed. 16 bit lock/unlock unit ‘u’ is obtained by 
concatenating x and y (each 8 bits) coordinates.  The ‘u’ values 
are sorted and first N of them are selected.  The Secret (SC) is 
divided into 9 non overlapping segments of 16 bits each. Each 
segment is converted to its decimal equivalent to account for 
the polynomial coefficients (C8, C7 …C0).  All operations takes 
place in Galois Field GF(216). 
The projection of ‘u’ on polynomial ‘p’ is found.  Now the 
Genuine points set G  is (ui, P(ui)). Random chaff points are 
generated which are 10 times in number that of the genuine 
points. Both the genuine and chaff point sets are combined to 
construct the vault. The vault is List scrambled.  
 
D. Fuzzy vault Decoding 
In the authentication phase, the encrypted vault and 
bifurcation feature point are decrypted by the combined 
password. Password based transformation is applied to the 
query feature points and the vault is unlocked.   
From the query templates of the iris, unlocking points (N in 
number) are extracted. The unlocking set is found as in 
encoding. This set is compared with the vault to separate the 
genuine point set for polynomial reconstruction. From this set, 
all combinations are tried to decode the polynomial. 
Lagrangian interpolation is used for polynomial reconstruction. 
For a specific combination of feature points the polynomial 
gets decoded.  
In order to decode the polynomial of degree 8, a minimum of  
at least 9 points are required.  If the combination set contains 
less then 9 points, polynomial cannot be reconstructed. Now 
the coefficients and CRC are appended to arrive at SC*. Then 
SC* is divided by the CRC primitive polynomial.  
 If the remainder is zero, query image does not match 
template image and the secret data cannot be extracted. If the 
remainder is not zero, query image matches with the template 
image and the correct secret data can be extracted.  In this case 
X’u  =  (Xu + Tu) mod (2 ^ 7) 
Y’v  =  (Yv + Tv) mod (2 ^ 9) 
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SC* is divided into two parts as the 128 bit secret data and 16 
bit CRC code.  
 
E. Parameters used in implementation       
The   parameters used in this implementation are shown in 
Table 1.  Chaff points hide the genuine points from the 
attacker.  More chaff points makes the attacker to take much 
time to compromise the vault but consumes additional 
computation time. The chaff points added are 10 times in 
number that of the genuine points.  
                         
                        TABLE  I  PARAMETERS OF  THE   IRIS VAULT 
  
Parameter Number 
No. of. Genuine  points(r) 20 
No. of   Chaff points(c) 200 
Total no. of  points 
(t = r + c) 
220 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The Iris template is transformed for three different user 
passwords to check for revocability. The Table III shows the 
sample bifurcation points from four quadrants after 
transformation using three different user passwords and soft 
biometric passwords generated as shown in table 2 and table 3. 
Consider a 5 character user password ‘FUZZY’, whose 
ASCII value is given by or 40 bits. Soft biometric password 
component is 155BM(24 bits). Soft biometric password and 
User Password are combined to form the transformation 
password as ‘155BMFUZZY’(64 bits) whose ASCII values are 
(155, 66, 77 ,70, 85, 90, 90, 89,) . These 64 bits are divided 
into four blocks of 16 bits each. Each 16 bit is divided into 7 
bits and 9 bits for transformation in horizontal and vertical 
direction. 
The feature point transformation is done with other two user 
passwords and soft biometric password combinations namely 
‘170GFTOKEN’ and ‘146AM VAULT’ whose ASCII codes 
are (170, 71, 70, 84, 79, 75, 69, 78,) and (146, 65, 77, 86, 65, 
85, 76, 84,) respectively. For the same original template 
different transformed templates are obtained when password is 
changed. Fig 3(a), Fig 3(b) and Fig 3(c) shows the transformed 
feature points for three different passwords.  The feature points 
of iris before and after password transformation is shown in 
table 4. This property of password transformation facilitates 
revocability. Different password can be utilized for generating 
different Iris templates. 
TABLE  III:  SHOWING THE STRUCTURE OF SAMPLE PASSWORDS 
 
Soft Biometric Password 
(24 bits) 
 
In the proposed method the security of the fuzzy vault is 
measured by min-entropy which is expressed in terms of 
security bits.  According to Nanda Kumar [7] the min-entropy 
of the feature template MT  given the vault V can be calculated 
as 
 
Where     
 r = number of genuine points in the vault 
 c = number of chaff points in the vault 
 t = the total number of points in the vault (r + c)  
 n = degree of the polynomial 
                     
The security of the iris, retina vault is tabulated in Table. V. 
In order to decode a polynomial of degree n , (n+1) points are 
required.  The security of the fuzzy vault can be increased by 
increasing the degree of the vault. Polynomial with lesser 
degree can be easily reconstructed by the attacker. Polynomial 
with higher degree increases security and requires lot of 
computational effort. This makes more memory consumption 
and makes the system slow. However they are hard to 
reconstruct.In the case of the vault with polynomial degree n, if 
the adversary uses brute force attack, the attacker has to try 
total of (t, n+ 1) combinations of n+ 1 element each. Only (r, 
n+1) combinations are required to decode the vault.  Hence, for 
an attacker to decode the vault it takes C(t, n+1)/C(r, n+1) 
evaluations. The guessing entropy for an 8 ASCII character 
password falls in the range of 18 – 30 bits.  Therefore, this 
entropy is added with the vault entropy. The security analysis 
of the  combined password hardened iris fuzzy vault is shown 
in Table 5.  
User 
password Gender 
(5 
character) 
(40 Bits) 
Height 
(0 – 
255) 
(8 bit) 
Iris color 
(1character) 
(8 bit) 
(M/F) 
(1charact
er) 
(8 bit) 
Combined 
Password 
(64 bits) 
FUZZY 155 B M 155BM FUZZY 
TOKEN 170 G F 170GF TOKEN 
VAULT 146 A M 146AM VAULT 
TABLE   II : EYE COLOR AND CHARACTER CODE 
REPRESENTATION 
 
Character Code 
Used Eye Color 
Amber A 
Blue E 
Brown B 
Gray G 
Green N 
Hazel H 
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Fig 3. (a) PASSWORD : VAULT146AM 
 
   
Fig 3. (c) PASSWORD : TOKEN170GF 
 
 
Fig 3. (b) PASSWORD: FUZZY155BM 
 
Fig 3. Transformed Retinal Features for Three Different Soft Biometric Passwords 
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TABLE   V     SECURITY ANALYSIS OF COMBINED PASSWORD HARDENED FUZZY VAULT 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Biometric templates are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. 
The only disadvantage of biometrics authentication as 
compared to traditional password based authentication is non 
revocability. The idea of cancelable biometrics overcomes that 
disadvantage. Iris has certain advantage as compared to 
fingerprint. Soft biometrics is ancillary information about a 
person, when combined with user password gives better 
results. It is very difficult for an attacker to gain the biometric 
features, soft biometric components and user password at the 
same time. The security of these cancelable templates will be 
the guessing entropy of the 8 character ASCII password which 
comes to be 18 to 30 bits in strength. The user password can be 
changed for generating revocable biometric templates. The 
revocable biometric templates are further secured by applying 
the ideas of fuzzy vault.  Due to this the security of the iris 
templates increases to 52 to 64 bits.  
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